Hostage situation
No new hostages were taken in this area of the Sahara in this period.
However in late May, some hostages were taken in Nigeria to the south of Niger. The kidnappers were initially not named, but later it was claimed that they had identified themselves with AQIM. How accurate this is, remains to be seen.
There was no firm news regarding either the remaining four Areva hostages taken from the uranium mine at Arlit in northern Niger by AQIM some months ago, nor the Italian hostage taken south of Djanet in Algeria.
There were occasional reports that negotiations for the release of the four hostages were ongoing and towards the end some sort of confirmation from the French government that they were still alive. It is not clear even in which country they are being held, though it is suspected to be Mali based on previous actions by AQIM.
However, there was also an odd report in the magazine ‘Air Info’ concerning an incident north of Arlit in June (see below), which the author quite frankly does not fully understand, and appears to conflict with other reports, claiming that this incident was part of an attempt to sell the French hostages to Libya in exchange for weapons and money.

The Mining and Petrochemical sector
There was a partial return by expatriates to the mine at Arlit during the period, but details were sparse.
It is clear that the Chinese industrial ventures are not being affected so much as the Western ventures and the oil installations south and west of Bilma continue to operate and the construction of a refinery near Zinder is reportedly progressing and should be producing by the end of this year. Indeed this, somewhat surprisingly, will apparently also serve northern Nigeria. The refinery near N’Djamena is also progressing. There are vague reports of it being linked to a Cameroon pipeline.
A Chinese mining consortium announced that it would recommence drilling in the Ténéré north and west of Fachi. This announcement appeared somewhat confusingly on the same day that the Chinese announced they were reducing their involvement in Libya, Niger and Tchad due to terrorist risk. Other reports indicated as much, but did not mention Niger or Tchad.

The Libyan refugee situation
The flow of refugees from Libya ino Niger and Tchad continued, but the arrival rate has abated. At the time of preparation of this news report, Tripoli had just been retaken by the rebels but Gaddafi himself was not located, but was still sending out messages from an undisclosed location. This recapture may result in another flow: or conversely, with the end of major combat even could have some refugees returning.
Whatever, the Niger government announced that some 210,000 Niger nationals had come back to Niger, mostly via Dirkou and Agades and that this was stressing the economy. The UN figures are slightly different. A few other nationalities also came back via Niger.
A smaller number of refugees had come back to Tchad. The 153 report last month saying that no refugees had come via Zouar in the Tibesti proved to be inaccurate. A report early in this period indicated that some 2000 had arrived in Zourate from Toummo, avoiding the direct and potentially mined route into Tchad from Libya. The majority of Tchad refugees had returned by the eastern land route, or via Egypt.

Support for Gaddafi against the Libyan rebels
With the fall of Tripoli, there were numerous vague reports of support for Gaddafi by mercenaries from Africa. The countries of Niger, Mali and Tchad, were mentioned, but as always the attribution was unconfirmed.
There have been some reports of African mercenaries captured: clearly some mercenaries did come from Mali and Tchad, but the real numbers are difficult to determine and they could be insignificant.
Almost surreally, there was one report of a camel train of weapons coming from Tchad towards Sebha in Libya which apparently was intercepted by jet fighters in early May. This report, which could not be confirmed, indicated that NATO fighters had struck a convoy of hundreds of camels transporting weapons and had caused significant casualties.

Mali
The country as a whole was quiet this period. However, in the north and west of Mali two significant incidents occurred.
In the first incident, which took place in Mali, but was conducted by Mauritanian troops at Wagadou reportedly some 100k inside Mali, some 17 AQIM rebels were reported killed for the loss of two government troops and a few injured.
In the second incident, which was just over the border in Mauritania, the Mauritanian government claimed to have inflicted heavy losses on AQIM, when AQIM raided a Mauritanian military compound at Bassiknou, (presumably in retaliation for the first incident), resulting in twenty dead AQIM rebels and a dozen prisoners. This action reportedly forced AQIM out of the region. But to what place did they go?
In another area, almost at the end of the period, the death was reported in northern Mali near Kidal (by accident, presumably a road accident) of Ibrahim Bahanga, who was one of the previous Mali rebel leaders. In the past Ibrahim Bahanga had held out for better compensation from the Mali government and had expressed support of Gaddafi. He was also reported to have raised mercenaries for him.
In July, there was a cholera outbreak between Mopti and Timbuktu when some 400 cases were reported. Fortunately only 32 deaths were reported.
Yet another gold mine has opened in Mali, helped no doubt by the new high gold price ($1750 at time of writing).
Protests in Mali both by opposition parties, and at a more muted level by the government about the NATO involvement in Libya continued, but at a lower level than the previous period. As the Gaddafi regime suffered continual military losses, these protests faded out.

Niger
The Niger economy has been hit badly by the number of refugees arriving back in Niger. They first swamped Dirkou, and large numbers are reportedly still in Agades, which is now apparently quite crowded and has refugee camps around the main town.
Security in the north and east of Niger has correspondingly decreased. There was an apparent car bomb incident in July near the gendarmerie in Agades. Numerous arms have been reported to have been confiscated from convoys coming from Libya, including, amazing though it may seem… a dismantled helicopter!
Some NGOs have returned to provide aid in the north and east of Niger, but tourism is still almost non-existent and there is limited security on the main routes. At least two incidents involving bandits were reported on the Agades-Bilma and Agades- Zinder routes. Land mines were also reported to be still present in a small village just north of Agades.
There was one serious incident in June when one soldier was killed and six injured in an exchange of fire with bandits north of Arlit (see above).
In Niamey, the Niger government has tried to clamp down on corruption. This appeared to annoy some old army personal and some others and in late July and early August several were arrested for a trying to plan a coup against the new democratic government.
The food situation in Niger also continues to be a concern. Despite the progress with new uranium mines and the Chinese industrial projects, the areas to the north and east of Niger continue to have limited supplies of food and require international assistance. With the new democratic government, loans and grants have resumed from Europe, but the sums required to effectively develop Niger are immense.
As in Mali, there were several protests early in the period against the involvement of NATO in Libya, but these died down as the Libyan war progressed.

Tchad
The situation in Tchad continues to be quiet compared with previous years. There were no significant actions on the eastern frontier with rebel groups, and only a handful of incidents in the south as a result of the conflict in CAR.
There were no incidents reported in the far north, but several reports indicated with the situation in Libya being so unstable, it is possible that the rebel movements in the north (specifically the Tibesti region) could get arms and support: this is an area which has not seen significant rebel activity for several years.
The number of refugees arriving from Libya has decreased. It appears from UN reports that most of the refugees came across the land frontier via Kufra, Sara, and Ounianga, though the reports are not entirely specific.
A new government was announced in mid August after the elections earlier this year when the president was re-elected for a fourth term. The official inauguration in August was attended by the president of the Sudan. The election’s validity was challenged by opposition groups.
At the end of June there was an official opening of the refinery north of N’Ddjamena. In addition, in August there were agreements signed to provide Sudan with oil directly from Tchad by pipeline, (and also for use as an oil export route) and to open up a rail link to Khartoum. This ambitious rail project was estimated at 2B$: an amazing amount for a country like Tchad.
Meanwhile in the east there are still a large number of refugees from Sudan and the international aid groups are still active. Security has however improved.
There was a report in July that the French military mission in Tchad was considering closure. This caused negative comments both from France and Tchad. It would appear at the time of this report that no final decision has yet been taken.
Finally, it looked likely that Hissene Habre would at last be extradited to Tchad from Senegal to face trial in July: but Senegal changed its mind at the last minute.

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