NIGER
The change in the Niger government following the coup this February, the progress towards a return to democracy, and the relationships with Europe, are well covered in the mainstream English press reports.
However, the increasing evidence of famine and crop failure in many parts of Niger has not been so well covered, and despite warnings from NGOs and the UN this issue has not achieved significant public attention, despite numerous reports of hardship, abandoned villages and a steady movement of people southwards in search of food.
In the town of Agades itself, the overall situation has little changed since the last 153 news report: if anything there have been more reports of banditry and theft, including one incident just north of Agades itself, at Dabaga, (curiously the same place where there were incidents before the Tuareg revolt), and a serious incident to the east.
Tourism was reported to be minimal this season in northern Niger despite the efforts of Point Afrique. Food in the area and in Agades has become expensive again. Crossing the Ténéré to Dirkou, reportedly now requires a military escort.
The NGOs are managing to get supplies into the villages the Aïr mountains, but reports from Agades indicate even these are at risk. Reports from further north are limited. The government has promised to supply some 30,000 tons of food purchased with the aid of Maroc and the Islamic development bank.
Security in the outskirts of Agades itself has not returned to normal. The roads to Arlit and on to Algeria have had incidents of theft and the route from Arlit to the Algerian border reportedly also requires a military escort.
Over towards the Mali border in the west, there was as serious attack in early March near Tillaberi on an army base by an armed group, with numerous casualties on both sides, though reports vary. This appeared to either be an AQIM group or a group associated with AQIM.
Meanwhile the progress on finally settling the Tuareg revolts in the Aï r, following the peace settlement last year has apparently ground to a halt with the coup. The ex-rebel movements warned about this situation in a joint communiqué in March, and as April went on it was clear that there is indeed peace but not a settlement and the funding provided by Libya for the settlement has run out.
Indeed, in April, two of the leaders of the Tuareg rebel movement were arrested in Niamey, namely Rhissa Ag Boula of the FFR and Kindo Kado of the FPN, but not the old leader of the MNJ, Aghali Alambo whose current whereabouts are not reported. Both arrested person had taken part in peace ceremonies earlier in the year.
The first had a murder conviction against him outstanding from the previous government, and was arrested as he arrived in Niamey to discuss a peace settlement with the Niger government. He previously was a minister under the overthrown president Tandja, before quitting over the alleged murder, and finally setting up the FFR. He had taken part in peace ceremonies in Arlit some weeks before without issue. Kindo Kado was reportedly arrested, shortly after his return to Niger, as being a deserter from the army who joined the rebels in 2007. There have been no reports of their release.
Then in April a French tourist, Michel Germaneau, with an Algerian driver, was kidnapped by AQIM, or its agents, whilst en route to Agades from Algeria. The location of the actual kidnapping varies tremendously between reports, (even by the normally vague standards of reporting one encounters for such events). One report even put it in Algeria north of In Guezzam! But it is believed to have taken place on the route south of Assamaka in Niger towards In Gall.
Whatever, the end result was that the single tourist and the Algerian driver were captured and then taken into Mali. The driver was then released in a rather odd sequence of events, which vary between reports, but eventually he apparently was found injured and possibly bound, near Tin Serrir, near the junction of the Niger, Mali and Algerian borders.
Then in mid May, this driver was arrested by the Niger government, presumably for complicity in the kidnap. The whole issue of the driver and his release is most unclear. AQIM have claimed responsibility for the kidnap and are seeking a ransom and release of their operatives from various jails. (See below under Mali for further details)
Finally in late May a group of ex rebels from the Tuareg movements appeared to have returned to Tamgak, the mountain base in the Aïr of the revolts, and published a communiqué pointing out the lack of a final settlement and the need of the government to take some sort of action. So far there have been no hostilities and it is not known how large this group is.
Meanwhile the activities of the Chinese and French in their respective commercial enterprises continue unabated, despite the uncertain contractual basis for their actions. And there has been yet another meeting regarding the financing of the final section of tarmac road of the central trans-Saharan route between Arlit and the Algerian frontier at In Guezzam. If complete it could bring significant traffic to the area.
In Niamey, it was also noted that veteran diplomat Robert Dulas who at one time was adviser to Bozize in the CAR was appointed as special envoy at the French embassy in Niamey.

TCHAD
Another quiet period for Tchad. The Tchad president, Deby shuffled his government again in early march: this seems to be a regular occurrence. He also made another trip to Europe, possibly for medical reasons. This time the reports of his imminent demise were greatly muted
The peace agreement between the Tchad government and the Sudan government made in February seems to be holding and in late May Deby made a further visit to Sudan, after the Sudanese leader was re-elected president, to continue the relationship.
As part of this relationship, despite the ceasefire agreement between the Sudanese rebel group the MJE and the Sudanese government, and the planned incorporation of MJE units into both the national armies of Tchad and the Sudan, in April Deby expelled the leader of the MJE, Dr Kahlil Ibrahim, from Tchad.
This was the sudden end of a long relationship, the Tchad government having had an agreement with the MJE to permit it to operate in eastern Tchad, and reportedly used its forces on occasion against the Tchad rebels groups. It was this group which was reportedly behind the attack on Khartoum before the peace agreement.
The break with the MJE was confirmed in May when the leader tried to return from Libya, temporary home of several rebel leaders, and he was refused entry and escorted back to the plane to return to Libya. He is reported to have since left for Qatar. Previously the Sudanese component of the MJE accused the Sudan government of bad faith and threatened to break off the cease-fire agreement, and there were limited hostilities.
Separate from the MJE, the Tchad rebel groups themselves, mostly encamped around the Tchad Sudan border, have seen a steady splintering this year, and a new cycle of alphabet soup movements in their place. In particular Mohammed Nouri, who at one time in the past was reportedly harassed whilst in Libya, broke with the UFR, and set up a new group known as the ANCD.
Then in April there was the only major clash on the border this period, to the south east, reportedly near the towns of Tissi and Tamassi, between another Tchad rebel group, the FPRN (a splinter of the UFR) and the Tchad government army. Reports of the conflict differ but it appears that both sides suffered significant casualties.
The anticipated winding down of the UN Mission MINURCAT mentioned in the last report was finally agreed with the Tchad government. It will cease operation by the end of this year. Several NGOs protested that they considered this force essential for security.
The last NGO hostages taken near the border were reported to be released at the end of March. This release did not get much publicity compared to the Mali kidnappings (below). Within Sudan itself there have been other kidnappings.
The warning issued by the UN on food production in Tchad mentioned in the last report was repeated in May when it advised that Tchad harvests were not adequate, but it appears that the scale of the issue is much less than in Niger.

MALI
The period started off well, with the release on the 10th March of the Spanish hostage Alicia Gamez, previously taken by AQIM and held hostage somewhere in northern Mali.
There followed the usual dispute over whether a ransom had been paid and AQIM operatives unnecessarily released. Algeria certainly thought so and continued its campaign against Mali over this. Against this were numerous messages of support from the United States
Then early in April two Italians freed were freed by the AQIM, namely Sergio Cicala, and his wife Philomène Kabouré. These were reported to be have been held by Abou Yaya Hamane, a lieutenant of Abdelhamid Abou Zeïd who had kidnapped and murderer the British hostage last year. A similar dispute over ransom payment ensued.
In late April a painful echo of the recent north Mali Tuareg revolt occurred when a truck drove over a landmine left behind from the conflict near Tin Zouawatine. Casualty reports of this incident vary.
And then at the end of April occurred the kidnap in Niger and rapid transport to Mali of the French tourist, reported above. The AQIM group quickly claimed responsibility.
In early May, the by now annual military cooperation exercise, ‘Operation Flintlock 10’ started with a reported 12 African states participating, under US leadership. It was planned to last for three weeks.
Later in May, the Algerians were reported to have clamped down on illegal immigrants living in Tamanrasset in southern Algeria and detained a large number, reportedly 750, presumably for repatriation. No figures were provided but it can be assumed that a significant percentage were probably Malians based on previous years.
Another report indicated that in fact there were a many more such people in Tamanrasset. Also in May, a large number of Malians, again presumably living in illegally in Libya, were thrown out and flown to Bamako.
On the positive side a UN study indicated that the incidence of AIDS had been substantially reduced in Mali, and there is a plan to open an iron mine later this year, to the east of Bamako.
The UN also reported that there was famine in north Mali, just as in neighbouring Niger, and the impact on livestock was devastating. This, like the famine in Niger has yet to receive significant international attention. There was yet another protest by the inhabitants of this region, centered on Kidal, claiming that not enough was being done by the Mali government to support them after the revolt.
In Bamako itself, a major market burnt down in the north of the capital in early May, but the reports did not indicate any casualties: a similar incident occurred a few years ago in Niamey.
In the middle of May an audiotape of the French hostage taken in Niger and now being held in Mali was provided via normal routes from AQIM, with an indication that his fate was in the French governments hands.
At the end of May that nothing further substantive has been heard of this hostage. It has not been reported where he is being held: this matches previous kidnappings where the government knew the location but did not reveal its knowledge until negotiations were complete.

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