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TCHAD
In March, the planed transfer of responsibility
from the EU peacekeeping force in Tchad to the new multinational
UN peacekeeping force (MINURCAT) went off without a major incident.
Yet again this was a complete contrast to Sudan, just across
the border, where the effectiveness of the peacekeepers in this
country is minimal.
Meanwhile, the various Tchad rebel groups consolidated into
yet another grouping, the UFR. (Union of Forces of Resistance,
for those who wish to follow the alphabet soup of organizations),
headed up by The RFD (Rally of Democratic Forces) leader under
Timan Erdimi (a relation of the Tchad president Deby) as its
leader together with other rebel group leaders
Despite much posturing by both the Tchad rebels and the government,
little happened in the ongoing civil war during most of this
period, until early in May, curiously just after an agreement
had been reported to have been reached on border incidents with
Sudan.
Initially there were reports of hundreds of vehicles being
seen near the border with Sudan, and the possibility of yet
another drive by Tchad rebels towards N’Djamena. Then
there were reports of a series of major battles near Abeche
and the eastern border towns including Goz Beida and Ade, between
the government forces and the Tchad rebels who had (presumably)
come across the border from Sudan.
These battles between the rebels and the government troops
and its local allies, lasted several days, and the Tchad government
was reported to have used aircraft against the rebels, even
admitting to have used them against targets inside Sudan itself.
Some reports indicated that the Tchad army had gone into Sudan,
claiming that some seven rebel bases were destroyed inside Sudan.
This battle and particularly the use of aircraft to attack
targets within Sudan, provoked the usual instant argument between
the Sudan and Tchad governments, with both sides threatening
the other.
A one point it looked like a full-scale war might start. The
UN condemned the rebel offensive. The French were even reported
to have approach Gaddafi for mediation: but in the event, as
of the end of May, nothing further happened and the fighting
has now died down.
Based on past experience we can expect to see some sort of
reaction from one side or the other later this year: in this
regard there was an attack by the MJE in Sudan towards the end
of May but the scale was limited.
The outcome of the battle itself was difficult to determine.
Even the actual locations of the battles, and the number of
troops on each side, differ widely between reports. Casualties
in the hundreds are reported.
Both sides have claimed victory, and the government has presented
captives and information in support of its claims. But several
reports indicate that the claims of neither side are credible.
Notwithstanding, the expected drive by the rebels on the capital
N’Djamena did not take place.
Earlier, in April an unusual event had occurred in the UN force:
the French contingent had a soldier who for whatever reason
shot several of his colleagues and went AWOL. He was picked
up later and was returned to the French forces.
Meantime in the north, the MDJT, the Tubu rebel movement based
in the Tibesti, which has been silent for some time now, announced
yet another reorganization, and press reports indicated it attacked
a military convoy in the Enneri Monmar towards the end of March.
This is the first report of conflict in this area for some time.
NIGER
A period with great hopes for peace: but hope does not always
bring results.
At the start of the period, in early March, there was confirmed
to be a further split between the rebel movements fighting against
the Niger government in northern and eastern Niger.
There are now three separate groups: the FFR, (Front of Forces
of Redressment) the MNJ (Monument Nigerian for Justice), and
the FPN (Front Patriotique of Niger)
There have been almost no conflicts in the Air Mountains or
the north and east of Niger reported this period. Despite this
and the reported split between the rebel groups, it is clear
from some press reports that there is still a significant presence
in the Air of rebel soldiers. However, limited NGO activities
have been reported to have restarted in the Air.
There were rumors of peace talks between the government and
the rebels early in March. Then following a surprise visit by
Gaddafi to Niamey in mid March, in early April the first talks
with Niger government representatives started in Libya under
Gaddafi’s sponsorship, which as usual led to grandiose
declarations of peace.
However, by mid April the MNJ indicated that it doubted if
the sincerity of if Niger government in the peace talks was
genuine. Later the FFR concurred with this position, as did
the FPN.
In early May, there was reported to be a meeting in Agades
between representatives of the rebels and the Niger president,
which according to the MNJ achieved little as the government
was unwilling to negotiate in good faith.
By then the MNJ released some more of its government soldier
captives in late April as evidence of goodwill, but claimed
that the government had not reciprocated with regard to the
prisoners in its hands, nor had it lifted the state of emergency.
The day after the meeting in Adages the president inaugurated
a new Uranium mine development at Imouraren near Arlit. Then
in late May, with no final settlement in sight, the state of
emergency was extended by the Niger Government for another three
months.
In late May the MNJ, after some talks reportedly started between
its representatives and the government in Niamey, the MNJ stated
that it wanted the talks moved elsewhere. Meanwhile Rhissa Ag
Boula (the key leader in the FFR) was reported seen in Libya,
and Kindo Zada (the key leader in the FPN and previously with
the MNJ) issued at least one communiqué from Tchad.
Reports from Agades indicate that the town is still deserted
compared to previous years and the tourist trade is still inactive.
But interestingly, a report in late May from Agades indicated
that the flow of migrants northwards to Libya was significantly
up from last year. and was causing the price of food in Agades
and other towns in the east to rise. Dirkou was reported to
be particularly affected.
Meanwhile in Niamey, the ex-prime minister Hama Amadou was
released from jail on grounds of ill health whilst awaiting
trial.
The political dispute on the possibility of changing the constitution
to allow a third term for the incumbent took a dramatic turn
when in late May, following an adverse constitutional court
ruling, the president dissolved parliament. The FFR immediately
issued a denunciation as did opposition political parties: but
some political organizations supported the move.
Shortly after this event there was yet another fire at the
Grand Marche in Niamey which caused significant damage. This
is no less than the third fire of its type in recent years.
One piece of good news. The annual meningitis outbreak in Niger
is reported as being less severe this year, despite there being
a significant number of deaths in Nigeria, just to the south.
MALI
Mali continues to maintain its status
as a responsible African state: during the last period it attracted
a number of loans from various aid agencies around the world
and cooperation agreements with other countries.
As the period ended the Mali president was off on another tour
round Europe, including visits to France and Austria. In the
first there is an outstanding issue with regard to the number
of Mali immigrants and their deportation from France.
In the case of Mali the number of such immigrants in France
is high and the agreement between the two countries on how to
handle them is not finalized.
There was (yet another) minor shuffle of the cabinet in mid
April.
The peace process in the north of Mali continues with only minor
problems, so far. Another major tranche of rebels (489) was
reported to lay down their weapons in mid April at Tessalit
near the Algerian border: the total number of such rebels is
now higher than most previous estimates. If true, the rebellion
may have been more widely supported than expected.
In this regards there was a short panic in late April when
there were reports that Ibrahim Bahanga, the only rebel leader
not to have signed the peace agreement was closing in on Kidal
with an column of vehicles. This proved incorrect, but the whereabouts
of Bahanga is not known.
Also in late April, a number, reports vary, of ‘Algerian’
rebels were intercepted in Northern Mali. Interestingly these
were not specifically identified as AQIM (Al Qaeda in the Maghreb).
Mali declined last year to provide a permanent base for American
troops, but there are several reports of US logistic bases in
Mali, notably one near Gao, and another near Timbuktu, with
a rotating force of several hundred staff in total, and frequent
reports of military corporation, and use of remote surveillance
capabilities. Another report indicated the presence of British
aircraft.
One can presume that these were in support of the search for
Fowler and the other hostages, see below.
Meanwhile, just as the period ended the French have apparently
come to an agreement to deploy some forces in Mali to support
them in their anti terrorist activities: some sources indicate
that Menaka is the planned location.
L’Affaire Fowler
Some good news. On the 3rd May Fowler with Louis Guay
was released by AQIM in Mali after a ransom was reportedly paid.
They were in reasonable health but suffering from their ordeal.
U.N. special envoy to Niger Robert Fowler and his aide Louis
Guay, both former Canadian diplomats, were travelling in Niger
last year when all three were seized some 45 km (30 miles) from
the capital Niamey leaving their car and cell phones behind.
Details of the release have not been issued and reports vary:
some mention the intervention of a prominent business man, others
mention the work of the Canadian and Mali diplomats, and others
mention the Libyan leader Gaddafi.
Specifically, details of their location when held during their
abduction were vague: but some reports indicated that they had
been held not been far from Kidal. Others that they were held
just north of Timbuktu. They were reported to have been held
by the faction of AQIM headed up by Mohktar Bel Mohktar.
No full account by Fowler himself has yet been published.
The two diplomats were later joined shortly thereafter by two
more released hostages, both female, who also appeared frail
on release. Gabriela Greiner of Switzerland and 77-year-old
Marianne Petzold of Germany, who needed a cane and had a bandaged
hand, leaving two tourists, one British and one Swiss still
as hostages.
Malian officials have indicated that there was evidence that
Fowler and Guay, along with the another European hostages, had
been traded up at least twice before being sold on to AQIM.
It is possible that the abductions were originally quite unconnected.
It had been reported that three suspects in the kidnappings
had been arrested in late March in northern Mali, which had
assisted the Mali authorities in tracing the location of the
hostages. Another report indicated that the British government
handed over details of calls by a specific phone, presumably
that of the British hostage.
AQIM continues to hold two remaining tourists seized after Fowler
and Guay were abducted: a British citizen and a Swiss citizen.
Late in April AQIM issue a threat claim that these remaining
hostages will be killed if a Al Qaeda member was not released
from prison.
On the 17th May AQIM then demanded 10 million Euros ($13.54
million) in exchange for both the Briton and a Swiss national
hostages, backing away from the threat to kill the hostages,
according to an Algerian report
Then on the 29th May AQIM issued a 15 day ultimatum to kill
Edwen Dyer, the British hostage, if d’Abou Qatada the
Al Qaeda member was not released from prison in England.
And so it stands as of the end of May.
Curiously, at about the same time as the latest threat from
AQIM, a statement was reported in the Algerian press issued
by ‘Le Para’. Le Para is the Algerian rebel leader
who was in charge of the German kidnappings near Illezi in Algeria
a few years ago. He is reportedly under detention in Algeria
after being captured in Tchad. This statement condemned the
actions of his previous ‘colleagues’ and recommended
that they cease their activities and seek a peaceful solution.
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