TCHAD
In March, the planed transfer of responsibility from the EU peacekeeping force in Tchad to the new multinational UN peacekeeping force (MINURCAT) went off without a major incident. Yet again this was a complete contrast to Sudan, just across the border, where the effectiveness of the peacekeepers in this country is minimal.

Meanwhile, the various Tchad rebel groups consolidated into yet another grouping, the UFR. (Union of Forces of Resistance, for those who wish to follow the alphabet soup of organizations), headed up by The RFD (Rally of Democratic Forces) leader under Timan Erdimi (a relation of the Tchad president Deby) as its leader together with other rebel group leaders

Despite much posturing by both the Tchad rebels and the government, little happened in the ongoing civil war during most of this period, until early in May, curiously just after an agreement had been reported to have been reached on border incidents with Sudan.

Initially there were reports of hundreds of vehicles being seen near the border with Sudan, and the possibility of yet another drive by Tchad rebels towards N’Djamena. Then there were reports of a series of major battles near Abeche and the eastern border towns including Goz Beida and Ade, between the government forces and the Tchad rebels who had (presumably) come across the border from Sudan.

These battles between the rebels and the government troops and its local allies, lasted several days, and the Tchad government was reported to have used aircraft against the rebels, even admitting to have used them against targets inside Sudan itself. Some reports indicated that the Tchad army had gone into Sudan, claiming that some seven rebel bases were destroyed inside Sudan.

This battle and particularly the use of aircraft to attack targets within Sudan, provoked the usual instant argument between the Sudan and Tchad governments, with both sides threatening the other.

A one point it looked like a full-scale war might start. The UN condemned the rebel offensive. The French were even reported to have approach Gaddafi for mediation: but in the event, as of the end of May, nothing further happened and the fighting has now died down.

Based on past experience we can expect to see some sort of reaction from one side or the other later this year: in this regard there was an attack by the MJE in Sudan towards the end of May but the scale was limited.

The outcome of the battle itself was difficult to determine. Even the actual locations of the battles, and the number of troops on each side, differ widely between reports. Casualties in the hundreds are reported.

Both sides have claimed victory, and the government has presented captives and information in support of its claims. But several reports indicate that the claims of neither side are credible. Notwithstanding, the expected drive by the rebels on the capital N’Djamena did not take place.

Earlier, in April an unusual event had occurred in the UN force: the French contingent had a soldier who for whatever reason shot several of his colleagues and went AWOL. He was picked up later and was returned to the French forces.

Meantime in the north, the MDJT, the Tubu rebel movement based in the Tibesti, which has been silent for some time now, announced yet another reorganization, and press reports indicated it attacked a military convoy in the Enneri Monmar towards the end of March. This is the first report of conflict in this area for some time.

NIGER
A period with great hopes for peace: but hope does not always bring results.

At the start of the period, in early March, there was confirmed to be a further split between the rebel movements fighting against the Niger government in northern and eastern Niger.

There are now three separate groups: the FFR, (Front of Forces of Redressment) the MNJ (Monument Nigerian for Justice), and the FPN (Front Patriotique of Niger)

There have been almost no conflicts in the Air Mountains or the north and east of Niger reported this period. Despite this and the reported split between the rebel groups, it is clear from some press reports that there is still a significant presence in the Air of rebel soldiers. However, limited NGO activities have been reported to have restarted in the Air.

There were rumors of peace talks between the government and the rebels early in March. Then following a surprise visit by Gaddafi to Niamey in mid March, in early April the first talks with Niger government representatives started in Libya under Gaddafi’s sponsorship, which as usual led to grandiose declarations of peace.

However, by mid April the MNJ indicated that it doubted if the sincerity of if Niger government in the peace talks was genuine. Later the FFR concurred with this position, as did the FPN.

In early May, there was reported to be a meeting in Agades between representatives of the rebels and the Niger president, which according to the MNJ achieved little as the government was unwilling to negotiate in good faith.

By then the MNJ released some more of its government soldier captives in late April as evidence of goodwill, but claimed that the government had not reciprocated with regard to the prisoners in its hands, nor had it lifted the state of emergency.

The day after the meeting in Adages the president inaugurated a new Uranium mine development at Imouraren near Arlit. Then in late May, with no final settlement in sight, the state of emergency was extended by the Niger Government for another three months.

In late May the MNJ, after some talks reportedly started between its representatives and the government in Niamey, the MNJ stated that it wanted the talks moved elsewhere. Meanwhile Rhissa Ag Boula (the key leader in the FFR) was reported seen in Libya, and Kindo Zada (the key leader in the FPN and previously with the MNJ) issued at least one communiqué from Tchad.

Reports from Agades indicate that the town is still deserted compared to previous years and the tourist trade is still inactive. But interestingly, a report in late May from Agades indicated that the flow of migrants northwards to Libya was significantly up from last year. and was causing the price of food in Agades and other towns in the east to rise. Dirkou was reported to be particularly affected.

Meanwhile in Niamey, the ex-prime minister Hama Amadou was released from jail on grounds of ill health whilst awaiting trial.

The political dispute on the possibility of changing the constitution to allow a third term for the incumbent took a dramatic turn when in late May, following an adverse constitutional court ruling, the president dissolved parliament. The FFR immediately issued a denunciation as did opposition political parties: but some political organizations supported the move.

Shortly after this event there was yet another fire at the Grand Marche in Niamey which caused significant damage. This is no less than the third fire of its type in recent years.

One piece of good news. The annual meningitis outbreak in Niger is reported as being less severe this year, despite there being a significant number of deaths in Nigeria, just to the south.

MALI
Mali continues to maintain its status as a responsible African state: during the last period it attracted a number of loans from various aid agencies around the world and cooperation agreements with other countries.

As the period ended the Mali president was off on another tour round Europe, including visits to France and Austria. In the first there is an outstanding issue with regard to the number of Mali immigrants and their deportation from France.

In the case of Mali the number of such immigrants in France is high and the agreement between the two countries on how to handle them is not finalized.

There was (yet another) minor shuffle of the cabinet in mid April.

The peace process in the north of Mali continues with only minor problems, so far. Another major tranche of rebels (489) was reported to lay down their weapons in mid April at Tessalit near the Algerian border: the total number of such rebels is now higher than most previous estimates. If true, the rebellion may have been more widely supported than expected.

In this regards there was a short panic in late April when there were reports that Ibrahim Bahanga, the only rebel leader not to have signed the peace agreement was closing in on Kidal with an column of vehicles. This proved incorrect, but the whereabouts of Bahanga is not known.

Also in late April, a number, reports vary, of ‘Algerian’ rebels were intercepted in Northern Mali. Interestingly these were not specifically identified as AQIM (Al Qaeda in the Maghreb).

Mali declined last year to provide a permanent base for American troops, but there are several reports of US logistic bases in Mali, notably one near Gao, and another near Timbuktu, with a rotating force of several hundred staff in total, and frequent reports of military corporation, and use of remote surveillance capabilities. Another report indicated the presence of British aircraft.

One can presume that these were in support of the search for Fowler and the other hostages, see below.

Meanwhile, just as the period ended the French have apparently come to an agreement to deploy some forces in Mali to support them in their anti terrorist activities: some sources indicate that Menaka is the planned location.

L’Affaire Fowler
Some good news. On the 3rd May Fowler with Louis Guay was released by AQIM in Mali after a ransom was reportedly paid. They were in reasonable health but suffering from their ordeal.

U.N. special envoy to Niger Robert Fowler and his aide Louis Guay, both former Canadian diplomats, were travelling in Niger last year when all three were seized some 45 km (30 miles) from the capital Niamey leaving their car and cell phones behind.

Details of the release have not been issued and reports vary: some mention the intervention of a prominent business man, others mention the work of the Canadian and Mali diplomats, and others mention the Libyan leader Gaddafi.

Specifically, details of their location when held during their abduction were vague: but some reports indicated that they had been held not been far from Kidal. Others that they were held just north of Timbuktu. They were reported to have been held by the faction of AQIM headed up by Mohktar Bel Mohktar.

No full account by Fowler himself has yet been published.

The two diplomats were later joined shortly thereafter by two more released hostages, both female, who also appeared frail on release. Gabriela Greiner of Switzerland and 77-year-old Marianne Petzold of Germany, who needed a cane and had a bandaged hand, leaving two tourists, one British and one Swiss still as hostages.

Malian officials have indicated that there was evidence that Fowler and Guay, along with the another European hostages, had been traded up at least twice before being sold on to AQIM. It is possible that the abductions were originally quite unconnected.

It had been reported that three suspects in the kidnappings had been arrested in late March in northern Mali, which had assisted the Mali authorities in tracing the location of the hostages. Another report indicated that the British government handed over details of calls by a specific phone, presumably that of the British hostage.

AQIM continues to hold two remaining tourists seized after Fowler and Guay were abducted: a British citizen and a Swiss citizen. Late in April AQIM issue a threat claim that these remaining hostages will be killed if a Al Qaeda member was not released from prison.

On the 17th May AQIM then demanded 10 million Euros ($13.54 million) in exchange for both the Briton and a Swiss national hostages, backing away from the threat to kill the hostages, according to an Algerian report

Then on the 29th May AQIM issued a 15 day ultimatum to kill Edwen Dyer, the British hostage, if d’Abou Qatada the Al Qaeda member was not released from prison in England.

And so it stands as of the end of May.

Curiously, at about the same time as the latest threat from AQIM, a statement was reported in the Algerian press issued by ‘Le Para’. Le Para is the Algerian rebel leader who was in charge of the German kidnappings near Illezi in Algeria a few years ago. He is reportedly under detention in Algeria after being captured in Tchad. This statement condemned the actions of his previous ‘colleagues’ and recommended that they cease their activities and seek a peaceful solution.